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The Legislator´s Role in Criminal Deterrence Policy 
 
 
 Determinate sentencing became the predominate sentencing philosophy in the mid 
1970s. Since then the literature on deterrence theory and criminal justice policy in general has 
paid much attention to the role legislators play in deterrence theory. It often lays much of the 
blame for any inefficiency and inefficacy of the criminal justice system on the theory itself and 
especially on the politicians. Downplaying political involvement was the order of the day in the 
early 20th century with its emphasis on professionalism and criminological expertise (von Hirsch 
1976; Tonry, 1992, 1996, 1999). As Erika Fairchild and Vincent Webb (1985, 16) put it: “The 
post-Progressive era is a consequence of emphasizing politics rather than progressive efforts to 
downgrade politics.” The 1970s emphasized greater political involvement in the criminal justice 
system through the enactment of determinate sentencing laws and legislative authorization of 
new prisons.  
Authors such as Wayne Welsh (1993), Joseph Davey (1998), Erika Fairchild and 
Vincent Webb (1985), and Alida Merlo and Peter Benekos (2000), to name but a few, have 
added their voices to this argument by stressing that for more than two decades now the 
academic community interested in criminological matters, that in the latter half of this century 
the legislature seemed to be the “best-equipped” to the problem of crime. Making the legislature 
the primary figure was intended to demonstrate a commitment on the part of the government 
(Windlesham 1998).   Today, a generation later, the legislature is among the most relevant 
actors but little referred to in systematic studies on deterrence studies. Legislatures adopt laws 
that significantly influence the intake into prison as well as the length of stay.  They also hold 
the power over the allocation of resources not only for the criminal justice system as a whole 
but for the individual organizations within the system.” (Welsh 1993). 
 2
Scant systematic research has been conducted toward to further our understanding of 
legislative sentencing policy and of how the legislatures affect deterrence theory. There are, so 
far as I can determine, no empirical studies on the determinants of the criminal sentencing 
policies, that is, statutory maxima, and no data exists in any collected form until now (see Lynch 
1988, 1993 for a qualititative approach to sentence severity and Bowers 1997, 1998; Bowers 
and Waltman 1993; and Marshall and Marshall 1997 for studies on judicially imposed severity 
studies). There is a lot of speculation and inconclusive cross-jurisdictional comparisons of 
sentence severity, but the severity he refers to is judicially imposed sentence severity and not 
sentence severity as it is adopted at the law-making stage. Statutory severity is important in and 
of itself. The legislative role is to provide the public with which to judge the seriousness of a 
given crime. The extent of their role in deterrence theory and practice is, however, much more 
critical. Legislatures set the rules. They first establish the threat of punishment; therefore they 
have the first say in what the expected cost of punishment should look like. By deciding the 
amount of resources to allocate to the criminal justice agencies, they ultimately influence the 
certainty and severity of punishment and, ultimately, the success of deterrence strategies. 
  
The Role of the Legislature in Criminal Policymaking 
 
Why is that determinate sentencing has left criminal justice scholars unsatisfied, just 
as they once were with the indeterminate sentencing scheme?  The “politics as symbolism” 
literature (Lasswell 1930; Edelman 1971, 1964; Oppenheimer 1974; Elder and Cobb 1983; 
Beckett 1998) provides one answer. In essence this literature, as applied to criminal 
policymaking, i.e. “law and order politics”, suggests that politicizing the issue of crime has 
made the production of rational criminal policies very difficult; some would say impossible 
(Elder and Cobb 1983; Tonry 1999; Merlo and Benekos 2000).  Candidates avoid serious 
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discussion of both the complex nature of crime and the commitment of time and resources 
necessary to confront this social problem [crime] adequately…the momentum of get-tough, 
punitive politics seems resistant to rational analysis of the causes of crime and consequences of 
retributive punishment. … As with the get-tough ideology and policies of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the post-modern penology is likely to generate its own dysfunctions.”(Merlo and Benekos 2000 
12,107). 
If politicians are, “single-minded seekers of reelection” as David Mayhew (1974) 
suggested and are only involved in “lawmaking, pork barrelling, and casework” (Fiorina 1975), 
they are concerned with the public interest insofar as they can attract and secure the vote. This is 
likely to undermine rational sentencing policymaking.  Elder and Cobb (1983, 1-2) claimed that 
politics is neither rational nor irrational but rather arational, meaning that while politics may 
have rational and irrational elements to it, it largely comes down to politicians working in a 
“loosely structured process of interpreting fragmentary information and ambiguous cues in the 
light of prior expectations and changing, uncertain, or conflicting personal preferences.”   
In the late 1970s Michael Hayes, building on theory by Robert Dahl and Charles 
Lindblom (1953); Theodore Lowi (1964; 1972), Morris Fiorina (1975), David Mayhew (1974), 
and Robert Salisbury and John Heinz (1970) developed a theory of transactional costs of 
lobbying.  In doing so, he discusses his take on Lowi and Edelman´s typology of policies. Of 
interest here is his argument on regulatory policy. Salisbury and Heinz (1970, 40) posited that 
“there is a fundamental distinction to be made between decisions that allocate tangible benefits 
directly to persons or groups…and decisions which establish rules or structures of authority to 
guide future allocations.” They go on to argue their viewpoint on how the politics of regulations 
is conditional upon the decisionmaking structure and the demand pattern for a given policy.  By 
decisionmaking structure, Salisbury and Heinz mean the degree of integration of the decisional 
system. By the pattern of demand, these authors refer to the degree of unity among the 
individuals or groups, and not merely their interests, when pressing for a given policy. 
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Depending on whether the degree of integration in the system and in the demand pattern are 
fragmented or integrated, legislators will behave one way or another; that is, they will produce 
one type of policy as opposed to another.  
This relationship among the decisional structure, demand pattern, and the cost of the 
policy to the legislators is what inspired Hayes to take Salisbury and Heinz´s theory a step 
further and postulate that legislators will likely pass on making decisions when the electoral 
costs to them of deciding one way or another are excessively high and when demand is 
sufficiently fragmented to allow them the needed room to maneuver. When it comes to criminal 
justice policy, the criminal justice system is permeated with institutional fragmentation as I 
discussed in the Chapter One. “Constituency problems are the second peculiarity of the criminal 
justice agencies [the first one is institutional fragmentation] that distinguish them from 
conventional policy-making agencies in American government.” (Nagel et al. 1983, 8). As for 
costs, crime is undoubtedly a controversial issue, one that can make or break an election 
campaign—that means it is costly. Finally in regard to the demand pattern, it may be arguably 
consensual, but it is quite diffuse (Niskanen 1971; Benson et al. 1995; Nagel et al 1983; Elling 
1996; Lynch 2000). “There is virtually no organized and effective political opposition to 
spending more money on police and prisons…There are no interest groups which can 
effectively support lower levels of spending on law enforcement and prisons.” (Lynch 2000, 5-
6). Salisbury and Heinz are careful to point out that consensual demand does not only refer to 
unity of interests among interested parties; the unity of the actors themselves is essential to their 
theory. “Criminals don´t have unions and political action committees to lobby against higher 
spending.” (Lynch 2000, 6). “Criminal justice shares with poverty policy the fact that organized 
constituencies that attempt to influence policymaking are not the clients of the system…, but 
rather the professionals who deal with them…Thus, it is the self-interest of professionals that 
become the focus of bargaining and compromise in policymaking.”(Nagel et al. 1983, 11). 
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What happens is what Hayes calls “issue movement.” That is, legislators will produce 
regulatory policy and defer the real decisionmaking process elsewhere. Since “A theory of 
policy formulation must, if it is to be comprehensive, account for policies made by all kinds of 
governmental agencies…” (Salisbury and Heinz 1970, 49), the other actors in the system would 
have to deal with the legislative regulatory policy.  In the criminal justice system, where would 
legislators delegate or in lay terms, where would they “pass the buck”?  To the administrative 
(law enforcement and prosecution and corrections) and the judiciary.  The end result is what 
Lowi (1969) calls “policies-without-law”.  From an applied criminal justice policy viewpoint, 
these would be criminal policies where policymakers will decide on statutory severity, for 
instance, in a way that will satisfy the public´s and the various interest groups´ demand for 
harsher punishment in a sufficiently abstract or vague manner. They will do this just enough to 
look as if they are acting on the issues (Lasswell 1930; Tullock 1967; von Hirsch 1976; Hayes 
1978,1981), but in reality all they are doing are granting those who will have to execute the 
policy or make the real decisions with a broad discretionary powers.  
“The number of statutes which pass the legislature, or the 
number of decrees which are handed down by the executive, but which 
change nothing in the permanent practices of society, is rough index of 
the role of magic in politics…  .” (Lasswell 1930, 195).   
 
 
This is the core of the “political symbolism” criticism of the legislative role in the making 
sentencing policy.    
 
Hypotheses 
 
The question of interest here is why some states or nations have more severe sentences 
than others. Why do jurisdictions differ in the level of severity? What are the key determinants 
of statutory severity in a given state or nation? To address these questions, I test four key 
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hypotheses.  As with any other policy, sentencing policy should constitute a reflection of: 1) the 
need for it; in this case that need originates from the crime rate; 2) the will or desire for it; here, 
that desire comes from the public and the policymakers themselves; and 3) the availability of 
resources. 
 Establishing the deterrent threat of punishment is influenced by a state´s need to 
reduce the crime rate. Policymakers in states with higher crime rates need to impose more 
severe deterrent penalties (the deterrent or need hypothesis). Elected public policymakers are 
also expected to be responsive to the public’s preferences in regard to policy choices or run the 
risk of being rejected in the next election period. One can thus expect public opinion to 
influence policymakers´ decision in establishing a credible sentencing policy. This is the 
“democracy-at-work” thesis (Beckett 1998). Public opinion can be more or less conservative or 
more or less liberal. We know from electoral theory that voters choose representatives that share 
their values and/or views on political issues. And we know that it is the role of the parties, 
among others, to aggregate public interests and translate public preference into policy. Those 
jurisdictions with a more conservative electorate would be inclined to adopt more severe 
deterrent threats and those with a more liberal electorate would adopt more lenient or less severe 
sentences.  
The potential that a jurisdiction will have to raise the public funds necessary to build 
more prisons should affect policymakers´ decision as to whether they should establish a greater 
or lesser severity of the deterrent threat. Some authors have argued that this may not be the case.  
The fact that other actors in the criminal justice system such as the courts and correctional 
agencies are more dependent on their environment than the legislature leaves the legislators 
with a greater margin to maneuver. Jurisdictions with more prison availability and great tax or 
revenue raising capacity are more likely to establish greater statutory penalties (the resource 
constraint or overcrowding effect hypothesis).  
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In addition to a direct effect, prison capacity could also mediate the political will to 
establish a specific penalty. This means that the relationship between sentence severity and 
public opinion would be conditional upon the availability of prison space and the capacity of a 
state to provide more space so that sentences in a very conservative but less affluent state may 
be more lenient than in an equally conservative but more affluent state.  Also, jurisdictions with 
a higher crime rate but overcrowded prisons may be more lenient than otherwise expected. 
Prison space availability and/or greater tax or revenue raising capacity conditions the political 
will and need for establishing more severe statutory penalties. 
 
Research Design and Data 
Tables 1 and 2 list the statutory maxima allowable in years for six different crimes in 
48 U.S. States (Alaska and Hawaii are excluded due to missing data on some key explanatory 
variables) and in 16 Western European nations. These maxima represent the set of dependent 
variables under analysis. The crimes covered are: robbery, burglary, and larceny in the U.S. and 
rape, robbery, and theft in Europe.i  
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Tables 3 and 4 present the descriptive statistics of the variables employed for the U.S. 
and Western Europe, respectively. These numbers tell that the deterrent threat as measured by 
the harshest allowable penalty for committing a particular crime is on average substantially 
higher for violent crimes than for property crimes, in both the U.S. and Europe. 
[Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
When comparing Tables 3 and 4, I can see that the U.S. is potentially harsher than the 
Western European nations under analysis. The U.S. also provides more prison space as there are 
comparably more crimes per 100,000 persons. In the U.S., robbery is punishable by death, 
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whereas in Western Europe, life is the maximum penalty for this crime. Life is also the 
maximum penalty for any kind of theft, burglary or larceny in both the U.S. and Western 
Europe. In general, though, the typical statutory penalties are a bit higher for the same crimes in 
the U.S. than in Europe. In the U.S., a criminal committing a first-time aggravated robbery 
could typically, on average, face up to about 260 months in prison; as many as 190 months on 
average for aggravated burglary and about a third of this, 64 months, for aggravated larceny.  
There were on average  in 1995 about 153 robberies per 100,000 persons, 925 burglaries for 
every 100,000 persons, and more than three times as many larcenies, 2,932 larcenies per 
100,000 individuals.   In Europe, a convicted criminal could get up to 242 months for a first-
time, aggravated rape, just about what criminal could face in the U.S. for robbery; about 213 
months for robbery; and about 123 months for theft.  During the same year, 1995, there were on 
average eight rapes for every 100,000 persons, nine times as many robberies or 76 for every 
100,000 persons, and over 400 times as many theft; that is almost 3,800 thefts per 100,000 
persons.  
European prison capacity was in 1995 considerably smaller than in the U.S.—78 cells 
per 100,000 persons, on average, in Europe and in the U.S. almost four times that, 300 beds for 
every 100,000 persons, assuming one bed for every cell.ii We know that at least in the U.S. this 
is a big assumption as double-bunking is widespread.  
On a scale from 1-5, government opinion in the U.S. is typically Center-Right around 
3.5, where a higher score indicates a more liberal attitude. Electoral opinion is conservative and 
ranges from .2 to 28 with a mean of 14.3. It is measured as the conservative balance, calculated 
by subtracting the percentage of those individuals identifying themselves as liberals from the 
percentage of those identifying themselves with the conservatives. Differently, European 
government opinion is Center-Left, –6, and the median voter´s left-right position, ranging from -
11 to about 21, is typically Center-Right around 6. 
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The Model and Findings 
 If one were to model the determinants of statutory severity for a given crime, such a 
model could look like the following: 
  
SentenceSeverity = β0 + β1CrimeRate + β2GovtOpin+ β3ElectOpin + β4PrisonCap + β5 
TaxCap /CorrectionsRev/StateGDP + β6 (TaxCap /CorrectionsRev/StateGDP 
*GovtOpin) + β6 (CrimeRate*PrisonCap) + β7OpportunityCosts,  
 
SentenceSeverity measures the maximal threat of punishment in months of 
imprisonment that rational potential criminal may expect to face when breaking the law. 
CrimeRate is the number of offenses per 100,000 persons. GovtOpin is the government´s 
opinion measured as the level of conservativism/liberalism of the government; ElectOpin is the 
electorate´s opinion measured as the level of conservativism/liberalism or Right/Left; 
PrisonCap refers to the number of available beds or cells for every 100,000 persons; TaxCap 
represents another source of resource constraint on policymakers. It is measured as either the per 
capita tax revenue or tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. CorrectionsRev and StateGDP, 
measured in per capita millions and billions of dollars, respectively, are alternative resource 
constraints in the case of the U.S.; Opportunity Costs refer to major social expenditures other 
than criminal justice expenditures that policymakers must also make. Specifically, they refer to 
public welfare and education expenditures in the U.S. case and health and education 
expenditures in Europe. 
There are several concerns with a model such as this one. For one, there is the potential 
reciprocal relationship between statutory maxima and the crime rate. Second, one could also 
make the case of a simultaneous relationship between statutory severity and the opinion 
variables. Of course 2SLS and 3SLS would be a solution to these concerns, however, as I will 
show, this would needlessly occupy time and space. The OLS results, reported below, are 
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sufficient to suggest what the data already suggest—that there is little to lead one to expect that 
legislatures to arrive at a rationally-derived deterrent penalty. States like Alabama, Maryland, 
Rhode Island, and Virginia have the same maximal penalty for burglary and larceny. One would 
hardly believe that with three times as many larcenies as there are burglaries, the legislatures of 
these States consciously meant to have burglars and thieves potentially receive the same 
penalty. 
For the sake of a preliminary exploration of what the results of an OLS 1995 cross 
section-regression analysis of the above model can reveal, I present Appendix Tables 1 through 
6; Tables Appendix 1-3 for the U.S. and Appendix Tables 4-6 for Western Europe.  
The results show that not much is going on here to explain criminal sentencing in the 
legislatures. To begin with, not one of our models, for any of the crimes, in the U.S. and in 
Europe alike, show significant effects.  Policymakers are simply not concerned with the need for 
the levels of severity. This means that we find no evidence that would imply that the crime rate 
is a driving force behind policymakers´ decisionmaking. In general, the results are also 
indicative of null effects of resource constraints. In regard to opportunity cost effects on setting 
the statutory penalty, in all but one model and only in the European case. The more resources 
spent on health services, the less severe the statutory penalty for robbery and theft but not so for 
the more serious crime, rape.  
Prison capacity is never statistically significant matter in arriving at statutory severity in 
either the U.S. and Europe, whether we are talking about direct or mediating effects. Political 
will is not mediated by the state´s prison capacity. There is no evidence that the availability of 
prison space or beds makes a bit of difference to policymakers. The same is true of the state´s 
capacity to back up the threat of punishment, at least in the U.S.. The state´s tax capacity to 
sustain the threat through the resources that policymakers allocate to the organizations in the 
criminal justice system that put that threat into effect does not condition governmental opinion 
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in the U.S., but does so in the European case. Here, the tax capacity restricts or limits the 
positive effect of governmental opinion on statutory severity. 
The results suggest that policymakers pay attention to what they think the level of 
severity should be limited only by the restriction of other social spending.  Across the models 
presented, the more conservative the governments the greater the sentence policymakers are 
likely to adopt.iii Only in the case of larceny does electorate opinion reach statistical significance 
and in the expected direction, that is, a more conservative electorate has a positive influence on 
severity.  
 
Implications for Rationality Expectations Theory in Criminal Policymaking  
While the evidence reported above is weak to nonexistent and potentially biased due to 
potentially reciprocal relationships between some the variables, it does suggest something 
important about the rationality or lack of it behind the sentences legislators adopt. We can say 
with some confidence that, aside from capital punishment, legislators are not too terrible 
concerned with variable punitive content for the sentencing policies they produce. Were they 
concerned, the level of severity they adopt, and tacitly approve by non-decisions thereafter, 
would be a reflection of the need for that level and the availability of resources. The notion of 
need here in this context is captured in the crime rates. As the results indicate, legislators do not 
appear to pay much attention to the crime rates nor to the level of prison capacity, which is that 
resource commonly agreed upon to be the most crucial resource limited in the criminal justice 
system. They are concerned with the desire for a given level of severity, as the “law and order” 
politics would lead us to expect. This means that they are simply concerned with conveying a 
tough approach, even if only symbolic, to the public. According to this body of literature, we 
should expect legislators to heed public opinion as much as possible. Political will has the 
primary role in criminal sentencing policy, at least where legislatures are concerned.  
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So if crime rates and resource capacity are not relevant factors in legislative sentence  
decisionmaking, the question becomes:  How do legislators arrive at the level of severity for a 
given crime? And how does the level of severity for one crime differ from the level of severity 
of another, if they differ at all?  Factor analysis, as I will show, allows one to decisively arrive at 
an answer to this question. 
SS Stevens (1975, 259) asked “How well does society´s accumulated wisdom or lack 
thereof in legislating punishment accord with the judged gravity of offenses?”  The just deserts 
rationale would suggest that severity should vary proportionately to the seriousness or harshness 
of a particular crime.  “Fear of harm ought to be proportional not merely to the gravity of the 
harm but also to the probability of the event.” (Arnauld in Logic, 1662, cited in Bernstein 1999). 
This would suggest that there should be something common at work—the association 
between the seriousness of the offence and the severity of the punishment—in all sentencing 
statutes. Therefore, the states or nations that have especially harsh or especially lenient penalties 
for one crime type would be expected to also have similarly harsh or lenient maxima for others. 
And states or nations would not adopt a greater severity of punishment threat for less serious 
crimes than for more serious crimes. This would make less serious crimes as punishable as more 
serious crimes and thus diminish the tradeoff effect between the deterrent cost of crimes (Becker 
1968; Sollars et al 1994; Mendes 2000).   
Looking to the data in Tables 1 and 2, the statutory maxima do not seem to have been adopted 
with the relationship between offense gravity and punishment severity. Too often the levels of 
severity among crimes do not differ much. 
In many U.S. States, the maximal threat for rape is greater than that of voluntary manslaughter 
or on a par. In some states, for instance Pennsylvania and Montana, maximal threat of 
punishment is the same across the crimes of manslaughter, rape, robbery, and burglary. In other 
states, the lack of a relationship between the seriousness of the offense and the severity of 
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punishment is more glaring. In Oregon criminals can expect to get up to 20 years for robbery or 
burglary but only five for forcible rape. In New Hampshire the threat for rape is about half that 
of robbery or burglary. And in South Carolina, a convicted felon could get up to a life sentence 
for burglary but only 30 for robbery or rape.  In Europe, Table 2 suggests that criminal severity 
threats are not as invariant as in the U.S.; however, in almost two thirds of the nations covered, 
the statutory severity of manslaughter is the same or about the same as that for theft. In England 
and Wales, a convicted person could get a greater punishment for theft—life—than for 
robbery—12 years.  If criminals are rational beings as deterrence theory assumes, how do 
severity ceilings such as these factor into the calculation of the expected cost of punishment? 
For more than 30 years, at least since the seminal work of Johan Thorsten Sellin and 
Marvin Wolfgang (1964), scholars have attempted to associate the judicial or imposed severity 
of punishment to the seriousness of the offense. Psychophysists argued that “human observers 
can judge the ratio of two sensations, and they can do so with fair consistency”(Stevens 1975, 
21).  The Weber-Fechner Law of “just noticeable differences” states that various responses are 
proportionate to the intensity of stimulus. In a punishment setting, this psychophysical law tells 
us that there should be a relationship between culpability and penal punishment, whereby more 
serious crimes should correspond to stiffer penalties (von Hirsch 1976; Green and Allen 
1981/82).This psychometric scaling or the measurement of sensation based on the estimation of 
the experimental perceived intensity of penal stimuli is referred to in the criminal literature as 
quantitatively-determined methods or consensual scaling. Other methods used to construct 
severity scales include subjective assignment and ex-poste judicially-derived scales (von Hirsch 
1976; Sebba and Nathan 1984; Ostrom and Ostrom 1999). Sentencing scholars such as Maynard 
Erickson and Jack Gibbs (1979), Catherine Fitzmaurice and Kenneth Pease (1986), Pierre 
Tremblay (1988), and Leslie Sebba and Gad Nathan (1984) have argued that crime seriousness 
scales/severity of punishment scales have been successfully constructed when based on 
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stimulus-response relationships. The evidence of this literature largely suggests curvilinearity 
(Erickson and Gibbs 1979; McDavid and Stipak 1981/82; Sebba and Nathan 1984); that is, 
there is a declining marginal disutility of the severity of punishment. Linearity would imply that 
equal increases in the gravity of an offense would on average correspond to an equal increase in 
the severity of the punishment. As the severity of punishment increases, the perceived utility of 
increased punishment does not increase indefinitely, but rather its rate of increase decreases 
once the level of severity reaches a specific level. 
These perceptual studies on the gradation or ordering of the severity of sentencing are 
based on information acquired from judges, inmates, and students (Buchner 1979; McDavid and 
Stipak 1981/82; Sebba and Nathan 1984; Tremblay 1986) but not from legislators. The results 
shown in this chapter suggest that perhaps there is a reason for this. A simple factor analysis of 
the statutory maxima, shown in Table 5, helps in arriving at a more confident conclusion 
regarding the rationality of legislative sentencing.  According to the evidence thus far presented, 
I would expect to find that there is no guiding force common to all sentence maximum lengths. 
What these analyses tell us is that there is essentially no commonality among the severity in the 
legislative arena. There does not appear to be a functional relationship between the severity of 
punishment of a given offense and the seriousness of that offense. These sentences appear to be 
as if essentially arbitrary. The scores in Table 5 represent the eigenvalues of the factor analysis 
of the sentence maxima logged and unlogged for the U.S. and European.iv In the U.S., the sum 
of the initial eigenvalues—1.432 in the case of the logged sentences and 1.225 when the 
sentence maxima are not logged—does not reach half of the number of source variables, that is, 
the number of crimes for which we have statutory sentence data. There are six such variables in 
the case of the U.S. analysis and five in the case of the Europe. The one exception is the logged 
version of the European maximum sentences. An eigenvalue of 1.0 means that the factor 
analysis accounts for as much variance as one source variable; an eigenvalue of six in the U.S. 
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for instance would indicate that there is one common factor among all six variables so that it 
would possible to reduce all six variables to a common factor.  An eigenvalue of 1.2 or 1.4 
indicates hardly any reduction toward a single factor (Uslaner 1976). These scores in other 
words reveal no commonality among the statutory maxima. Pure and simple. 
[Table 5 about here] 
A comparison of these factor analysis results to the results of another set of factor 
analyses of variables that are surely expected to have some common ground among would help 
stress this point. Such variables could be the crime rates of the respective offenses. Despite the 
complexity of explaining crime rates, judging from the factor analyses presented in columns 
three and four in Table 5, these do seem to have at least one common factor explaining them.  
The sum of the eigenvalues is about three or greater (out of seven source variables) in both the 
U.S. and Europe, regardless of whether they are logged or not. 
 What does this mean for sentence severity as the ultimate threat of punishment and 
essential component in the expected cost of punishment? More importantly, what does it mean 
for deterrence theory as it is applied to the criminal justice system as a rational deterrence 
strategy? From a policy perspective, which is the perspective relevant here, it simply means that 
legislatures are not approaching the criminal justice system from the rational mind set that 
stands behind deterrence theory.  They are not concerned with the other actors´ (in the criminal 
justice system) expectations, as the theory requires. “…if punishment is to play any role in 
criminal justice, existing  penalties must be converted into a rational system.” (Erickson and 
Gibbs 1979, 105).  Hayes´s argument of legislators “passing the buck” to the executive and the 
bureaucracy seems all too fitting for what appears to be going on here. “When the legislature 
determines sentencing ranges, it is operating at a level of abstraction far removed from 
individual case dispositions, or even the allocation of resources to courts and correctional 
agencies.  At that level of abstraction the symbolic quality of the criminal sanction is of great 
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importance.” (Zimring 1976, 13).  The statutes allow law enforcement and judicial actors 
enough latitude to carry out their function in the criminal justice system. The establishment of 
the threat of punishment in the legislative arena is not driven by any justifiable, objective need. 
So to answer Stevens´s question, legislated punishment does not accord very well with intuitive 
reasoning on the gravity of the offense.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper investigated the determinants of the legislative threat of punishment for 
noncapital crimes. The story it tells is one of legislative uncoordination when it comes to setting 
the deterrent threat of punishment. This part of the criminal justice system is not concerned with 
setting rational component of deterrence, making them irresponsible from an applied policy 
view.  Rather, legislative policymakers in delegating discretionary powers to the remaining 
actors of the criminal justice system they also delegate the potential for any rationality to them. 
Statutory severity of punishment is irresponsive to the need for more deterrent policies and the 
financial capacity to secure the threat of punishment. 
The extent of the legislative involvement in the establishment of the potential threat of 
punishment appears all but blind to the crime rates, as well as prison capacity and tax capacity.  
In this way, the legislatures introduce the possibility of slippage in deterrence as a rational and 
comprehensive applied strategy. Rationality in applied deterrence strategies is absent in the 
legislative arena. Legislators leave rationality to the bureaucratic apparatus of the criminal 
justice system and the judiciary.  Political will is the driving force behind legislative sentencing 
decisions, the only determining factor. The general finding is, as expected, more conservative or 
Right-leaning governments tend to adopt more severe threats of punishment.  
There is no evidence that existing prison capacity makes a difference in deciding when 
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to level off statutory severity, but it would be interesting to see if, to what extent, and under 
what conditions legislative policymakers account for the level of severity they stipulate when 
adopting or tacitly approving the statutory maxima for a given crime.  At some point politicians 
have to be held accountable even if that accountability lie in the budgetary allocation decisions 
they make. If policymakers are at all serious about deterrence strategies, then they have to 
empower the actors to whom they delegate decisionmaking power with tangible or material 
assets to make real decisions. 
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Table 1: U.S. Maximum Statutory Prison Sentences 
 
State Murder Culpable/Vol. 
Manslaugher 
Rape Robbery Burglary Theft 
Alabama Death 20 Life 10 10 10 
Arizona Death 5 7 4 5 2 
Arkansas  Death 10 Life 20 20 10 
California Death  11 8 5 6 3 
Colorado Death 8 16 8 8 8 
Connecticut Death 40 25 10 5 1 
Delaware Death 10 Life 5 8 1 
Florida Death 15 40 15 15 5 
Georgia Death 20 Death  20 20 10 
Idaho Death 15 Life Life 10 1 
Illinois Death 14 30 30 30 10 
Indiana 30 6 20 20 6 1 
Iowa Life 10 Life 25 25 1 
Kansas Death .8 10.3 5.1 2.8 .6 
Kentucky Death 20 20 20 20 5 
Louisiana Death 40 Life 40 12 10 
Maine Life 40 10 40 5 .5 
Maryland Life 10 Life 20 15 15 
Massachusetts Life 20 Life 10 20 5 
Michigan Life 15 15 15 10 5 
Minnesota Life 15 20 20 20 5 
Mississippi Death 20 Life 15 10 5 
Missouri Death 20 Life Life 20 10 
Montana Death 40 Life 40 40 .5 
Nebraska Death 25 25 50 25 5 
Nevada Death 10 Life 20 15 5 
New Hampshire Death* 30 7 15 15 7 
New Jersey Death 20 15 15 7 4 
New Mexico Death 4 24 12 2 2 
New York Death 25 25 15 15 1 
North Carolina Death 8.8 30.8 8.8 8.8 0 
North Dakota Life 20 20 10 10 5 
Ohio Death 25 25 15 25 5 
Oklahoma Death Life Death Life 20 10 
Oregon Death 20 5 20 20 5 
Pennsylvania Death  10 10 10 10 5 
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Rhode Island Life 30 Life Life 10 10 
South Carolina Death 30 30 30 Life 3 
South Dakota Death life 25 25 25 10 
Tennessee Death 15 60 60 15 6 
Texas Death 20 Life Life Life 1 
Utah Death 15 Life Life Life 1 
Vermont Life 15 Life 10 25 10 
Virginia Death 10 Life Life 20 20 
Washington Life 10 20 20 20 5 
West Virginia Life 15 35 20 15 1 
Wisconsin Life 60 30 15 15 .8 
Wyoming Death 20 50 25 25 10 
 
Source: U.S. State Penal or Criminal Codes (Cornell Myron Taylor Law Library). 
 
* New Hampshire repealed the death penalty in 2000. 
 
Notes: 1.) These are penalties for a first-time, aggravated form of each offense. 2.) The length of sentence is in years. 
3.) Murder penalty is for 1st degree murder.4.) Rape is unarmed, forcible rape of a person that is not a minor but can be 
aggravated if causing serious injury.  5.) Robbery is unarmed, unaided robbery of a person < 60 years of age, but can be 
aggravated if causing serious injury. 6.) Burglary is unarmed breaking and entering of a dwelling that may or may not be 
occupied.7.) The sentences for theft refer to offenses that exceed $500.00 in value but do not exceed $1,000.00 in value. 
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Table 2: European Maximum Statutory Prison Sentences 
 
Nation Murder Manslaughter Rape Robbery Theft 
Austria Life 10 15 15 15 
Belgium Life Life Life 20 10 
Denmark Life 4 10 10 4 
Finland Life 4 12 12 4 
France Life 3 20 20 10 
Germany Life 5 15 20 10 
Greece Life 5 20 Life 10 
Italy Life 5 12 20 6 
Luxembourg Life Life Life 15 10 
Netherlands Life Life 12 15 6 
Norway Life 6 Life 12 6 
Portugal 25 5 10 18 8 
Spain 20 4 12 5 3 
Sweden Life 10 10 10 6 
Switzerland Life 10 20 20 10 
UK (Eng & Wales) Life Life Life 12 Life 
 
Source: Library of Congress, Washington D.C. and interviews with legal specialists in foreign law of the Law Library of 
Congress (January 2000). 
Notes: 1.) These are penalties for a first-time, aggravated form of offense. 
 2.) The length of sentence is in years. 
3.) Theft includes acts that can be classified as burglary and larceny. 
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Table 3: Variables, Sources, & Descriptive Statistics for the U.S. 
 
Variable 
Variable Description Source Mean/St. Dev. Min./Max. 
RobbStat Sentence  severity measured as maximum number 
of months in prison allowable by law for 
aggravated robbery 
State Penal 
Codes 
259.458 151.455 48 720 
BurgStat Sentence  severity measured as maximum number 
of months in prison allowable by law for 
aggravated burglary 
State Penal 
Codes 
189.313 108.085 20 480 
LarcStat Sentence  severity measured as maximum number 
of months in prison allowable by law for 
aggravated larceny 
State Penal 
Codes 
64.083 51.999 0 240 
CrimeRate9094 Average crime rate measured as the number of 
offenses committed per 100,000, 1990-94 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
5010.335 1246.935 2548.333 8336.5 
RobbRate Robbery rate measured as the number of robberies 
committed per 100,000, 1995 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
153.25 102.241 10 423 
RobbRate9094 Robbery rate measured as the number of robberies 
committed per 100,000, 1990-94 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
162.215 119.414 8.833 547 
BurgRate Burglary rate measured as the number of burglaries 
committed per 100,000, 1995 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
924.729 273.904 351 1522 
BurgRate9094 Burglary rate measured as the number of burglaries 
committed per 100,000, 1990-94 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
1020.458 299.850 449.5 1854 
LarcRate Larceny rate measured as the number of  larcenies 
committed per 100,000, 1995 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
2931.500 801.472 1103 4926 
LarcRate9094 Larceny rate measured as the number of  larcenies 
committed per 100,000, 1990-94 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
3002.294 633.919 1565.5 4514.333 
PrisCap96 Average rated prison capacity  measured as the  
number of beds or inmates assigned by a rating 
official to institutions per capita,  1996* 
BJS Prisoners 
Bulletin 
.003 .001 .001 .007 
PrisCap9095 Average rated prison capacity  measured as the  
number of beds or inmates assigned by a rating 
official to institutions per capita,  1990-95* 
BJS Prisoners 
Bulletin 
.003 .001 .001 .005 
GovtOpin Attitude measured as a support scale scored 1-5  
based on the Senate National Election Study 
(SNES); high means more liberal attitude.  
Norrander 
(forthcoming) 
3.554 .236 3.050 4.010 
ElectOpin Electorate conservatism or public opinion as 
measured by the liberal-conservative ideological 
identification based on the cumulative CBS/ New 
York Times opinion surveys (high means more 
conservative) 
Erikson et al. 
(1993) 
14.297 7.506 .2 28 
TaxCap9095 Average per capita tax  revenue measured  millions 
of dollars, 1990-95 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
.001 .0003 .0007 .002 
Gdp9095 Average per capita state GDP measured in billions 
of dollars (chained 1992 dollars), 1990-95 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
.00002 .000004 .00002 .00004 
CorrectionSp9095 Average per capita state spending on corrections 
measured in millions of dollars, 1990-95 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
.0001 .00003 .00003 .0002 
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PubWlfSp9095 Average per capita state spending on public welfare 
measured in millions of dollars, 1990-95 
Statistical 
Abstracts of  the 
U.S. 
.001 .0002 .0003 .001 
TaxCap9095*GovtOpin Interaction term between TaxCap9095 and GovtOpin Computed .002 .001 .001 .003 
Gdp9095 *GovtOpin Interaction term between Gdp9095 and GovtOpin Computed .00003 .00001 .00002 .0001 
CorrectionSp9095*  GovtOpin Interaction term between CorrectionSp9095 and 
GovtOpin 
Computed .0001 .0001 .00003 .0002 
TaxCap9095*   CrimeRate9094 Interaction  term between average TaxCap9095 and  
CrimeRate9094 
Computed 6.571 2.287 3.464 16.060 
TaxCap9095*     RobbRate9094 Interaction  term between average TaxCap9095 and  
RobbRate9094  
Computed .220 .183 .011 .938 
TaxCap9095*   BurgRate9094 Interaction  term between average TaxCap9095 and  
BurgRate9094  
Computed 1.337 .453 .414 2.205 
TaxCap9095*    LarcRate9094 Interaction  term between average TaxCap9095and 
LarcRate9094  
Computed 3.927 1.175 2.014 8.606 
CorrectionSp9095* CrimeRate9094 Interaction  term between average CorrectionSp9095 
and  CrimeRate9094 
Computed .378 .189 .113 1.145 
CorrectionSp9095*  RobbRate9094 Interaction  term between average CorrectionSp9095 
and  RobbRate9094  
Computed .014 .014 .0002 .064 
CorrectionSp9095*  BurgRate9094 Interaction  term between average CorrectionSp9095  
and  BurgRate9094  
Computed .080 .042 .011 .161 
CorrectionSp9095*   LarcRate9094 Interaction  term between average CorrectionSp9095  
and LarcRate9094  
Computed .227 .107 .070 .613 
Gdp9095* CrimeRate9094 Interaction  term between average Gdp9095 and  
CrimeRate9094 
Computed .117 .040 .062 .297 
Gdp9095*  RobbRate9094 Interaction  term between average Gdp9095 and  
RobbRate9094  
Computed .004 .003 .0002 .016 
Gdp9095*  BurgRate9094 Interaction  term between average Gdp9095 and  
BurgRate9094  
Computed .024 .008 .009 .039 
Gdp9095*   LarcRate9094 Interaction  term between average Gdp9095  and 
LarcRate9094  
Computed .070 .022 .040 .159 
PrisCap9095* CrimeRate9094 Interaction  term between average PrisCap9095 and  
CrimeRate9094 
Computed 12.693 7.394 3.148 39.434 
PrisCap9095* RobbRate9094 Interaction  term between average PrisCap9095 and  
RobbRate9094  
Computed .476 .443 .008 1.857 
PrisCap9095* BurgRate9094 Interaction  term between average PrisCap9095 and  
BurgRate9094  
Computed 2.798 1.890 .421 7.570 
PrisCap9095 *LarcRate9094 Interaction  term between average PrisCap9095 and 
LarcRate9094  
Computed 7.649 4.357 1.934 21.132 
 
* Rated capacity is available for most cases, but when it is not, operational capacity, defined as the number of inmates that can be accommodated 
based on the existing programs, staff, etc. is employed; and in the few cases where operational capacity it not available, design capacity is used, 
whereby design capacity is defined as the number of inmates that planners or architects intended for the facility. 
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Table 4: Variables, Sources, & Descriptive Statistics for Western Europe 
 
Variable 
Variable Description Source Mean/St. Dev. Min./Max. 
RpStSev Sentence  severity measured as number of maximum 
months in prison allowable by law for aggravated 
rape 
European Penal 
Codes 
242.118 141.684 120 480 
RbstSev Sentence severity measured as number of maximum 
months in prison allowable by law for aggravated 
robbery 
European Penal 
Codes 
213.177 113.170 60 480 
ThftStSev Sentence  severity measured as number of maximum 
months in prison allowable by law for aggravated 
theft 
European Penal 
Codes 
122.824 99.547 36 480 
CrimeRate9094 Average crime rate measured as the number of 
offenses committed per 100,000 persons 
European 
Sourcebook on 
Crime and Criminal 
Justice Stats 
1999;2000 
5725.423 3272.178 886.340 10974.2 
RapeRate Rape rate measured as the number of rapes 
committed per 100,000 persons, 1995 
European 
Sourcebook on 
Crime and Criminal 
Justice Stats 
1999;2000 
8.047 4.099 1.7 19.3 
RapeRate9094 Average rape rate measured as the number of rapes 
committed per 100,000  persons from 1990-94 
European 
Sourcebook on 
Crime and Criminal 
Justice Stats 
1999;2000 
7.333 3.965 1.380 19.660 
RobbRate Robbery rate measured as the number of robberies 
committed per 100,000 persons, 1995 
European 
Sourcebook on 
Crime and Criminal 
Justice Stats 
1999;2000 
76.235 49.605 15 181 
RobbRate9094 Average robbery rate measured as the number of 
robberies committed per 100,000 persons from 1990-
94 
European 
Sourcebook on 
Crime and Criminal 
Justice Stats 
1999;2000 
78.109 52.101 12.800 220.250 
TheftRate Theft rate measured as the number of thefts 
committed per 100,000 persons, 1995 
European 
Sourcebook on 
Crime and Criminal 
Justice Stats 
1999;2000 
3797.882 2331.875 706 8448 
TheftRate9094 Average theft rate measured as the number of thefts 
committed per 100,000 persons from 1990-94 
European 
Sourcebook on 
Crime and Criminal 
Justice Stats 
1999;2000 
3968.234 2510.458 498 8452 
PrisCap Prison capacity  measured as the number of prison 
cells per 100,000 persons, 1995 
European 
Sourcebook on 
Crime and Criminal 
Justice Stats 
1999;2000 
83.889 28.326 41 176 
GovtOpin Average government Laver-Budge Left-Right scores 
based on CMP coding of party platforms at each 
election period; negative #s indicate Left leaning; 0= 
Center; positive #s  indicate Right leaning 
Comparative 
Manifesto Group 
-6.143 8.433 5.396 -22.557 
ElectOpin Median voter Left-Right score based on formula by 
Kim and Fording (1998) and using CMP data; 
negative #s indicate Right leaning; 0= Center; 
positive #s  indicate Left leaning 
Comparative 
Manifesto Group 
6.111 8.673 -11.273 20.782 
TaxCap Revenue from taxes measured as a  percentage of 
GDP, 1995 
World Economic 
Indicators 
32.968 6.418 19.654 42.983 
TaxCap9094 Average revenue from taxes measured as a  
percentage of GDP from 1990-94 
World Economic 
Indicators 
33.028 6.546 20.067 44.648 
PopDen Population per km2, 1995 World Economic 
Indicators 
137.398 113.563 14.210 456 
PopDen9094 Average population density from 1990-94 World Economic 
Indicators 
131.837 109.779 13.974 447.289 
HealthSp Percentage of GDP spent on health, 1995 World Economic 
Indicators 
6.309 1.000 4.380 8.130 
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HealthSp9094 Average percentage of GDP spent on health from 
1990-94 
World Economic 
Indicators 
6.202 1.036 3.642 7.668 
TaxCap9094 *GovtOpin Interaction term TaxCap9094andGovtOpin Computed -208.846 277.333 -717.082 111.929 
TaxCap9094* 
CrimeRate9094 
Interaction term TaxCap9094and CrimeRate9094 Computed 188699.9 121099.9 25704.5 410601.7 
TaxCap9094*   
RapeRate9094 
Interaction term TaxCap9094and RapeRate9094 Computed 246.650 148.245 46.910 666.042 
TaxCap9094*       
RobbRate9094 
Interaction term TaxCap9094and RobbRate9094 Computed 2574.265 1765.83 371.209 6391.132 
TaxCap9094*  
TheftRate9094 
Interaction term TaxCap9094and TheftRate9094 Computed 129374.1 89117.31 14442.36 277364.6 
StatSev*RapeRate9094 Interaction term  RpStSev and RapeRate9094 Computed 1811.76 1301.034 198.72 4392 
StatSev*RobbRate9094 Interaction RbstSev and RobbRate9094 Computed 14375.74 11210.47 36009 47232 
StatSev*ThftRate9094 Interaction term ThftStSev and TheftRate9094 Computed 583911.9 873095.9 59760 3655968 
PrisCap*CrimeRate9094 Interaction term PrisCap and CrimeRate9094 Computed 478256.1 268264.807 36339.94 1031468 
PrisCap*RapeRate9094 Interaction term PrisCap and RapeRate9094 Computed 620.018 344.824 97.80 1376.2 
PrisCap*RobbRate9094 Interaction  term PrisCap and RobbRate 9094 Computed 6559.030 4153.177 524.890 17179.5 
PrisCap*ThftRate9094 Interaction term PrisCap and ThftRate9094 Computed 331133.80 202698.434 20418.00 746426.81 
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Table 5:  Factor Analyses of U.S. and European Statutory Maximum Sentences 
and Crimes Rates 
 
 
 
 
 U.S. 
 
European  
 
Variables 
Initial 
Eigenvalues 
 
Initial 
Eigenvalues of 
Variables 
Logged 
Initial 
Eigenvalues  
Initial 
Eigenvalues of 
Variables 
Logged 
Statutory Severity     
Murder .076 .104 .232 .337 
Manslaughter .168 .307 .408 .600 
Rape .273 .241 .279 .304 
Robbery .334 .406 .632 .783 
Theft   .677 .825 
Burglary .222 .293   
Larceny .152 .081   
Sum of Eigenvalues  
1.225 1.432 2.228 2.842 
Crime Rates 
    
Homicide .570 .706 .368 .307 
Rape .251 .280 .709 .722 
Assault .700 .761 .565 .676 
Robbery .606 .751 .244 .388 
Theft   .598 .469 
Drug   .268 .292 
Burglary .565 .438 .527 .409 
Larceny .259 .178   
Sum of Eigenvalues  2.951 3.114 3.279 3.263 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis; Rotation Method: Varimax 
 
                                                          
i As annotated in Tables 1 and 2, theft includes criminal acts that may categorized as burglary and larceny according 
to U.S. standard definition of these crimes. For life and death sentences, we follow the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
National Reporting Program criteria of converting these sentences to 35, 40, or 60 years depending on whether we 
are talking about life with the possibility of parole, life without the possibility of parole, and death, respectively. 
They are the maximum allowable sentences for a first-time but aggravated form of each offense. 
ii We know that at least in the U.S. this is a big assumption, given that double-bunking is widespread. 
iii Since government opinion is coded so that a negative sign indicates a more conservative position, I multiplied the 
scale by –1 so that a unit increase in this opinion scale, leads to an increase in the number of months of the threat of 
punishment. Only in the case of larceny does electorate opinion reach statistical significance and in the expected 
direction, that is, a more conservative electorate has a positive influence on severity. 
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iv There are two reasons for factor analyzing the logged values, one is statistical and the other is theoretical. The first 
is provided in the literature on sentence severity scaling: the declining marginal utility of the severity of punishment. 
Thus, logging the variables allows us model the function more adequately. Tufte (1974, 108) explains a second 
reason. Given the large variance among the sentences, the potential skewness in the distribution of the source 
variables is great. He explains that logging, for instance, these sentence maxima “spreads out the clustered values” 
and “pulls otherwise outlying values toward the middle of the distribution”.  
 
